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The review of the collective monograph Vitality of Phenomenology: Tradition and Renewal traces vari-
ous aspects of an interesting and peculiar design implemented in this publication. Non-thematic unity 
and community of traditions (philosophical and cultural) are united under the same cover of the au-
thors of this monograph. Following the centripetal tendencies in the development of phenomenology, 
the authors nevertheless are united by a single task of finding the growth points of the phenomeno-
logical tradition and discovering new thematic areas in which phenomenological analysis can be ap-
plied. The problems of the life world and the position of phenomenology in modern discussions with 
representatives of analytical philosophy on the problems of consciousness, the thematic intersections 
of phenomenology with anthropology, hermeneutical philosophy, biological and linguistic research 
are becoming the subject of analysis. The authors of the sections not only trace the obvious lines of the 
development of phenomenology in the concepts of M. Heidegger, M. Merlot-Ponti or O. Fink, but bold 
parallels with the theory of deconstruction of J. Derrida, with modern ideas of bioethics or traditions 
of Japanese spiritual culture are discovered and argued.
Key words: phenomenology, tradition, consciousness, life world, hermeneutics, being, intentionality, 
anthropology.
© EKATERINA ANANIEVA, 2020
HORIZON 9 (1) 2020 419
РЕЦЕНЗИЯ НА КНИГУ ДЖОВАННИ ЯН ДЖУБИЛАТО (РЕД.)  
LEBENDIGKEIT DER PHÄNOMENOLOGIE:  
TRADITION UND ERNEUERUNG / VITALITY OF PHENOMENOLOGY: 
TRADITION AND RENEWAL  






В рецензии на коллективную монографию «Жизненная энергия феноменологии» прослежи-
ваются различные аспекты интересного и своеобразного замысла, осуществленного в данном 
издании. Не тематическое единство и  не общность традиции (философской и  культурной) 
объединяют под одной обложкой авторов данной монографии. Следуя центростремительным 
тенденциям в развитии феноменологии, авторы тем не менее объединены единой задачей по-
иска точек роста феноменологической традиции и обнаружения новых тематических областей, 
в  которых может быть применен феноменологический анализ. Проблематика жизненного 
мира и позиции феноменологии в современных дискуссиях с представителями аналитической 
философии по проблемам сознания, тематические пересечения феноменологии с антропологи-
ей, герменевтической философией, биологическими и лингвистическими исследованиями ста-
новятся предметом анализа. Авторами разделов прослеживаются не только очевидные линии 
развития феноменологии в концепциях М. Хайдеггера, М. Мерло-Понти или О. Финка, но об-
наруживаются и  аргументируются смелые параллели с  теорией деконструкции Ж. Деррида, 
с современными идеями биоэтики или традициями японской духовной культуры.
Ключевые слова: феноменология, традиция, сознание, жизненный мир, герменевтика, бытие, 
интенциональность, антропология. 
If one understands tradition as an opportunity to give something of value “for 
safe storage,” then one can say that the publishers and drafters of this monograph 
have tried to show the significance of the phenomenological tradition as such an in-
strument and space for the preservation and development of phenomenology as an 
environment, that stimulates the birth of new ideas. This environment goes beyond 
national schools. This overcoming of borders chooses the logic of “traveling to a new 
land” and “mapping of its various ‘regions’ ” not only as an elegant metaphor, even if 
to a certain extent as a guide to action. Noteworthily, within the tradition shared by 
the authors of this monograph phenomenological philosophy avoids a systemic form 
and exists as a tension between the depth of studying particular problems and the 
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breadth of the survey of the successes of phenomenological analysis in studying more 
global subject areas.
The dynamics of the latest increments of these thematic areas in phenomenol-
ogy embraces numerous fields from the traditional sphere of humanities—to modern 
interdisciplinary research in the so-called “naturalized phenomenology” and to the 
analysis of the successes of empirical research in psychology, psychiatry, medicine, 
and not least in neurobiology. In the thematic variety of articles included in the mon-
ograph, the concept of life, put into the title, is successfully played out. The problems 
of the life-world and the phenomenological interpretation of new achievements in the 
life sciences are presented in a productive dialogue.
The monograph is opened by an article by Guido Antonio de Almeida, professor 
at the University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Bra-
zil), which serves as a kind of methodological introduction to the following sections. 
In a critical analysis of the phenomenological tools, the author follows E. Tugendhat 
and L. Wittgenstein and largely joins the arguments of his predecessors, seeing as a 
peculiarity of his approach the movement not so much from general theoretical ap-
proaches to particulars, but rather from the empirical analysis of linguistic analysis to 
theoretical generalizations. The ultimate level of theoretical generalization in this case 
is the level of consciousness, and “any theory of consciousness should either explain 
the phenomenon of intentionality, or eliminate it.” But, turning to the phenomenon 
of intentionality as a field of discussion of phenomenology and analytical philosophy, 
we find that there is an aspect of the study of consciousness that inevitably requires 
access to the macro level. It is an analysis of the “the expressive force of the speech 
(such as its meaning, its reference, its truth and its demonstrative strength)” (Giubila-
to, 2018, 18–19). Modern theoretical approaches in linguistics suggest moving in this 
analysis “…do not derive from the linguistic unities, […] but rather from the person 
who speaks in the speech, or more precisely, from the way in which the person under-
stands it” (Giubilato, 2018, 19). In the logic of the study of this linguistic understand-
ing the possibility of repeated presentation of the above, the possibility of repetition 
is important. Even so, repetition in speech has a special character, and the intentional 
act in this case “…does not designate what is ordinarily understood by a relation, i.e. a 
relation between two already-given terms which could be determined separately and 
autonomously.” From the point of view of linguistic empiricism “…this ‘intentional 
relation’ has the paradoxical property of preceding the related terms” (Giubilato, 2018, 
21). It seems that this contradicts Husserl’s original intuitions. “Husserl wants show 
that the unity of the intentional consciousness is immediate and it is always already 
given in every intentional act: the unity of the temporal flow of experiences is real-
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ized by a ‘fusion’ (Verschmelzung) of the experiences with each other, insofar as every 
single experience and every intentional act bears a vast horizon of anticipations and 
retentions” (Giubilato, 2018, 21). But if the intentional act cannot be understood as 
“…the activity of a ‘subject’ or an ‘ego’ subjacent to the intentional acts, then we can 
no longer consider the intentional act as accessible to introspection and as in the inner 
sphere of a subject. How, then, can the intentional act be accessed?” (Giubilato, 2018, 
26). As the author of the article sees it, the solution to this difficulty can be a reference 
to the implementation of an intentional act in a symbolic environment. Similarly, “…
the anticipative intentional reference must be mediated by some other presence, by 
some other element presentially given, whose only task is to refer to the absent object 
but without capturing or arresting our gaze within itself. This is precisely the function 
of the linguistic signs…” (Giubilato, 2018, 27). If we interpret thinking as basically a 
linguistic phenomenon, then the circle in the definition at first glance is overcome.
Since the proposed interpretation of the phenomenological theory and the au-
thor himself seem radical and “heretical,” he accepts the need to distinguish between 
understanding linguistic phenomena in a broad sense and expressiveness as a prop-
erty of speech. “…when we ask for the meaning of an expression, with ‘expression’ 
we do not mean the word expressed hic et nunc, but the expression in specie. Using 
a different terminology, we could also say that it is the word as ‘type’ and not as ‘to-
ken’ ”(Giubilato, 2018, 35).This typological character of the word the author brings 
the concept of noems in phenomenology closer and enters into a polemic in this sense 
with Tugendhat, who, in a similar context, considers it necessary to distinguish be-
tween the ideas of early and late Husserl. Not seeing it possible to agree with Tugend-
hat’s criticism of the phenomenological interpretation of intentionality as a movement 
from the fallacies of the “early” Husserl to the fallacies of the “late” Husserl, the author 
insists on a substantial relationship between the phenomenological approach and the 
hypotheses of analytical philosophy:
We see that resorting to the notion of noema does not lead to some kind of loss of the 
‘universal character’ of meaning. […] Both the phenomenological notion of ‘apprehen-
sion-sense’ and the analytical notion of ‘identification-rule’ focus on the same situation: 
the understanding of an ensemble of determinations which not only enable the anticipa-
tion but also the identification of a given object. (Giubilato, 2018, 40)
But the author does not see this intermediate result as final—he considers it 
possible to go further in interpreting intentionality from the horizon of the language: 
to show the impossibility to limit oneself only to nominative expressions. This move 
is defined not only by the definition of a word as a type and by the necessary reference 
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to other types of expressions, except nominative. The author, according to the logic of 
movement from linguistic empireia, considers it necessary to emphasize: 
…What could be the object of a sentence or a predicate, except the object corresponding 
to their subject? […] the assimilation of linguistic expressions in general to nominal 
expressions and consequently the reduction of the expressive function to a function of 
designation, could be done only if we are willing to accept the existence of a phantas-
magoric universe populated by objects such as the ‘no,’ the ‘with,’ the ‘P-factum,’ the 
‘being-green,’ etc. as objective correlates of the expressions ‘no,’ ‘with,’ ‘x,’ ‘is green.’(Giu-
bilato, 2018, 40–41)
In this regard, it seems important to the author to redefine the concept of the 
synthetic function of consciousness, taking it beyond the boundaries of the usual 
Kantian constructions. We see, that in language the function of conjunctions consists 
not only and not so much in obtaining a definition appropriate for the object. Instead, 
in outlining a possible semantic horizon: synthesis in speech is therefore “…the antic-
ipation of a possible synthesis, in which an object can be identified, or, in other words, 
in which an object can be given according to the sense referred to” (Giubilato, 2018, 
44). Thus, the synthesis realized by “the connective ‘and’ is not a synthesis between 
objects but a synthesis of determinations, i.e. sentences” (Giubilato, 2018, 54). 
Thus, according to the author, it is possible to show that the linguistic dimen-
sion refers to the intentional act as a pre-emptive perception of the object or, better 
saying: it is an act of linguistic understanding (Giubilato, 2018, 55). Such assumptions 
are possible if some hypotheses regarding the nature of consciousness, and if prefer-
ence is given to the “operational” understanding of the intentional act. According to 
the author, the idea of representation should be abandoned in favour of the method 
of carrying out the operation (identification, definition, etc.). An operation, in turn, 
is determined by a rule that establishes how it is implemented. That is why, as the au-
thor believes, the critical confrontation between Tugendhat and Husserl did not take 
place. The entire argumentation of the criticism proposed by Tugendhat assumed “…
that phenomenology, conceived as theory of mental acts guided by representations, 
is radically opposed to linguistic analysis, as theory of linguistic acts guided by rules” 
(Giubilato, 2018, 55). The author rightly believes that this is not so. Therefore, sum-
ming up his analysis, the author emphasizes that in phenomenology the fundamen-
tal role of language remains underestimated. Simulary it boils down to the following 
dichotomy: “expression (of ideal contents of meaning)—communication (of mental 
contents).” It is this underestimation “…of the communicative function of language 
brings phenomenology towards a transcendental subjectivism, which finally leads to 
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a complete opposition to a conception of language as practice of a collective form of 
life” (Giubilato, 2018, 57).
The first article of the monograph opens a virtual discussion between various 
phenomenological approaches. James Mensch from Charles University Prague, Czech 
Republic, known for his work on a wide range of phenomenological issues in its his-
torical and modern dimensions, tells in a very personal manner his story of bridging 
the gap between the humanitarian and the natural Sciences. This story begins in the 
50s and through a romantic fascination with cosmology and the Big Bang theory leads 
to conclusions about the duality of coding the world in terms of bodies and causes 
and in terms of goals and means,—conclusions, descent with Chalmers’ apologies for 
a break in the description.
Against this background, the distinction between real and ideal relations adopt-
ed by Husserl in Logical Investigations contrasts the randomness of our circumstances 
of judgment with the necessary content of the judgment. Nevertheless, according to 
the author, it does not answer the broader question. “How does a causally determined 
mind come to know ideal relations—especially if, as Husserl asserts, its acts of judging 
are ‘causally determined’?” (Giubilato, 2018, 63). Paraphrasing De Boer, the author 
points out that “Husserl overcomes the ‘naturalization of the ideas’ [in this work] but 
not yet the naturalization of consciousness” (Giubilato, 2018, 64). To overcome this 
last Husserl uses a “transcendental” phenomenological reduction, and the world loses 
the status of description in terms of causality and receives the “status of existence in 
this Ego.” According to the author, such a solution is not free from insoluble contra-
dictions. And the Heideggerian interpretation of Dasein does not take into account, 
for well-known reasons, all the dimensions of this relationship: “His discussion of 
Dasein’s being-in-the-world is more or less silent on the embodiment that makes us 
part of the world” (Giubilato, 2018, 70). Quoting Merleau-Ponty, the author returns to 
the problem of being in the world, but in a new sense: bodily embodiment can be un-
derstood as folds of our flesh, drapery and line our contact with the world. Thus, we 
“equalize” the world in its sound, using our ears, or in its tactile qualities through our 
sensitive skin and so on. Thus, our corporeality provides measures, by the words of 
Merleau-Ponty, “for being, dimensions to which we can refer it” (Giubilato, 2018, 71). 
The challenges and reviews found during the analysis are supplemented by questions 
that, as the author believes, remained unrealized possibilities of this rout: 
Reading it a half a century after its completion, I asked myself about the implications of 
his proposed integration of consciousness with the world: How, for example, does this 
integration address the ‘hard problem of consciousness’? How does it change our under-
standing of objective knowledge? (Giubilato, 2018, 73) 
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The author’s answer is the development of a metaphor, also found on the pag-
es of Merleau-Ponty’s works—a metaphor for interweaving (the interweaving of the 
subjective thread into the world and the objective (linguistic, communicative) line 
into subjectivity. “Thus, whenever scientists, in their theories about what counts as 
objectively real, undermine the perceptual basis of science, they engage in a version 
this contradiction” (Giubilato, 2018, 75).
Annette Hilt (Johannes-Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, Deutschland) addresses 
the problems of the life world and the meaning of Eugen Fink that is imperceptible. 
Agreeing with E. Fink that the fundamental question of phenomenology is the ques-
tion of the source (Ursprung) (Giubilato, 2018, 82), Annette Hilt focuses on this aspect 
of the problematization of the world—the issue of the ultimate horizon in which the 
world is given—as ordinary and trivial, or, conversely, as transcendental. According 
to the author, the essential feature of Fink’s interpretation of the world is highlighted 
in the concept of “invisibility”—the world does not declare itself, but on the borders 
of what no longer belongs to it, turns out to be non-worldly. 
Andriano Fabris (University of Pisa, Italy) refers to a comparative analysis of 
the concept of phenomenology by Husserl and Heidegger. In search of the ambigu-
ity declared in the title, the author begins by stating that the philosophical problem, 
which serves as the basis for Heidegger Husserl’s criticism and encourages him to try 
to “destroy” (deconstruct) the philosophical approach found by Husserl, consists in 
their different interpretation of subjectivity. This topic has been repeatedly selected 
as the subject of analysis of the interpreters of phenomenology. In one of Heidegger 
Husserl’s most radical assessments, he connects his interpretation of subjectivity with 
the Cartesian perspective of res cogitans (Giubilato, 2018, 94). Tracing the emergence 
of Dasein’s idea in Heidegger’s lecture courses, the author of the article shows paral-
lels between the rejection of the concept of subject and the rethinking of the concept 
of intentionality. Heidegger’s Intentio and intentium do not remain poles of a single 
relationship, since it is not possible to achieve a description of being in the world by 
not introducing the conceptual framework of Kantian philosophy—the juxtaposition 
of “things in themselves” and “phenomena,” or by introducing the concept of expe-
rience (Erlebnis). “It is precisely this relationship that has to be considered as funda-
mental. It involves a preliminary, not a derivative, connection between intentio and 
intentum” (Giubilato, 2018, 96). As a result, phenomenology—and the various ways 
in which it conducts its analysis—no longer focuses on judgment as an instrument 
of philosophical analysis. In the new understanding of philosophical objectivity, the 
goal of its research becomes a prerequisite for the very idea of reflexivity, developed 
by phenomenology. In this sense, philosophy “…coincides with the ‘science of Being.’ 
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Phenomenology, in its turn, constitutes the way—or, to say it better, the totality of the 
possible ways—in which this research on Being is carried out” (Giubilato, 2018, 98). 
Ontological differentiation, which allows us to distinguish between being and being 
…allows us to broaden the notion of ‘phenomenology,’ which can thus be applied both to 
the beings and to the Being itself. It therefore seems that the phenomenological perspec-
tive—from which, following his critique of Husserl, he seemed to distance himself—has 
been reformulated; it reappears in a new guise, its meaning has been transformed, it has 
a different function and is placed on another level: that of Being in general. (Giubilato, 
2018, 101)
Thus, the author of the message finds the ambiguity of criticism of Husserl’s 
phenomenology in an ambiguous understanding of the correlation and relation. Hei-
degger transforms phenomenology in such a way that he can uniquely focus on the 
“how” that characterizes being… Being as such, that is, the main task of philosophical 
research is also a phenomenon. Therefore, it manifests itself in its “how.” Therefore, 
everything is, so to speak, a “method.” More precisely, this is all the way: even if our 
destination is unclear; even if—as in Tao, the form of oriental wisdom that Heidegger 
began to explore after the Second World War—the path itself can be traced while we 
move along it. That is why it is no coincidence that Heidegger chose the expression: 
„Wege, nicht Werke“ as his motto for his “Gesamtausgabe” (Giubilato, 2018, 102).
Toru Tani from Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan, refers to the medial na-
ture of phenomenology from the horizon of the known challenge to the human being 
“know yourself!” This slogan in this case means a challenge to the European practice, 
which is philosophy, from the side of non-European thinking: whether the universal 
claims of phenomenology turn out to be a kind of blindness in relation to who we are 
Europeans or residents of other cultural regions. If we take into account the judgment 
of the Japanese philosopher Sakabe Megumi (1936–2009), that “traditional Japanese 
thinking and Cartesian philosophy oppose each other diametrically” (Giubilato, 2018, 
106). The challenge that his article answers is the opportunity to prove or refute the 
possibility of instilling the phenomenological philosophy inheriting Descartes to Jap-
anese mental culture. Without turning to the justification of any of these polar opposi-
tions, the author explores the medial component of phenomenology, focusing on the 
concept of “expression” in Husserl and the concept of mediality (Giubilato, 2018, 106). 
Instead, not only aspects of mediality associated with the consciousness of time are 
investigated in this message. In addition to the connotations known to Europeans be-
tween the internal and external manifestations of the Self, the author draws attention 
to the formatting of these relations by the experience of the language. In Japanese, un-
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like European, there are not two ways to contact the person you are talking to (“you” 
and “you”), but much more. This choice of method of expression is determined by the 
“relationship” (aidagara) between the speakers. In this sense, the aidagara precedes 
the “person.” The “person” expressed in Japanese is not so much “personal” as “inter-
personal” (Giubilato, 2018, 115). The Japanese philosophical tradition does not accept 
the European concept of “substance”or the accompanying idea of “fulfilment.” In tra-
ditional European thinking, the “space” between two substances is “empty.” Japanese 
terminological language introduces a number of terms that are difficult to find the 
exact equivalent in European languages. Such is awai, which can be very conditionally 
translated as “between,” awai is not an empty space, but a fundament for “producing” 
and “pairing”—a place where the respective explicit appearances of something and 
something other are prepared. (Giubilato, 2018, 116). The given example is not the 
only one in this post, but the author is not interested in the possibility of multiply-
ing the examples, but in the possibility of drawing general conclusions from them. 
Among other things, the author emphasizes that the archeology of knowledge evokes 
different connotations in the Japanese mental space than in the logic of movement 
from surface phenomena to their implicit basis. Therefore, in conclusion, he refers 
to Spinoza’s statement “extreme arrogance indicates extreme ignorance of oneself ” 
(Ethica, vol.4, Theorem 55) and rings the stated theme: “Instead of ignorance, know 
thyself in the Between, where phenomenology will lead thee” (Giubilato, 2018, 117).
Eder Soares Santos from the State University of Londrina, Brazil even more 
clearly focuses on the human dimension of phenomenology, referring to the science 
of man, as it is implemented in the Heidegger phenomenological approach. Mention-
ing the ambiguity of the position of anthropology in Heidegger’s field of thought, the 
author proposes to consider Dasein analytics in the hermeneutics of factuality as a 
tendency opposing a critical impulse to the human sciences, and at the same time as 
a kind of therapy that could replace traditional psychoanalysis (Giubilato, 2018, 118).
In the proposed disposition, only the position on the correlation of anthropol-
ogy and psychoanalysis is not obvious. This last is deduced from the opposition of 
activity and non-action. “Serenity is the attitude of mind that lets go, that allows itself 
to flow, as opposed to thinking, which acts (wirken). That ‘allowing’ is neither active, 
nor passive; it takes place by not-doing (Nicht-handeln)” (Giubilato, 2018, 122–123). 
Following Heidegger, the author shows the possibility of reorienting oneself from the 
horizon of questions that are asked from the perspective of knowledge itself. 
…“what is man?”, but much more so to ask ‘how and who is man?’, causing an effect of 
displacement, deconstruction, and unconcealment of speeches, whose discourses are en-
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tangled and hidden by technological language, and thus shocking common language to 
create a space for the production of new reflections and meanings. (Giubilato, 2018, 125)
The author shows the possibility of avoiding this “technologization,” attachment 
to purposeful argumentation chains—the possibility of interpretation as therapy.
Robson Ramos dos Reis from the Federal University of Santa Maria, Brazil ad-
dresses the meanings and limitations of Heidegger’s concept of being to death in Being 
and Time, addressing attention to the need to fundamentally distinguish the death of 
animals and plants from the meaning that Heidegger puts into the concept of “being 
to death.” In whis way, he examines the modes of existence of Dasein. The author 
emphasizes the “hermeneutic ontological pluralism of Being and Time,” which is real-
ized in such a way that such concepts as “existence,” “determination,” “individuation,” 
“totality,” “possibility,” “necessity,” and, among other things, a part and the whole, life 
and death—allow more than one interpretation depending on the class of phenomena 
to which this concept is related. 
One of the outcomes of this analysis is that there is a difference between the dying of 
living entities (animals and plants) and the dying peculiar to entities that have the way 
of being of existence. In this context, Heidegger uses the concept of an intermediate phe-
nomenon (Zwischenphänomen) to characterize the physiological death of entities that 
have the mode of being of existence. (Giubilato, 2018, 135) 
Quoting Heidegger, the author emphasizes that a comparison of the biological 
existence and the existence of Dasein makes it possible to give a clearer definition of 
the knowledge that sets the boundary for it: “Dasein can be completed without actual-
ly dying. [„Dasein aber auch enden kann, ohne daβ es eigentlich stirbt.“] As a result of 
this terminological clarification, it becomes clearer that ‘to die’ means a way of being, 
not an end” (Giubilato, 2018, 138–139). This distinction reveals a number of conse-
quences. Among other things, “for entities enjoying the mode of being of existence, 
the foundations of their specific manner of having something lie in the constitution 
of being-in (In-sein), which means to be structured by understanding (Verstehen), 
attunement (Befindlichkeit), and speech (Rede)” (Giubilato, 2018, 140). Developing 
the idea of a productive tension between the two kinds of mortality of creatures, the 
author sees in this topic a certain increment of hermeneutic phenomenology. Thus, 
“…the hermeneutic opacity of human existence, which derives from the condition 
of being thrown into a factical existential situation, would also be determined by the 
factum of being thrown into a specific setup of intermediate phenomena” (Giubilato, 
2018, 143).
428 EKATERINA ANANIEVA
César Lambert from the Pontifical Catholic University of Valparaíso, Chile 
(Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, Chile), refers to a comparative anal-
ysis of the concept of “power” in the concepts of Max Scheler and Edith Stein. In his 
analysis, the author begins by analyzing Scheler’s The Human Place in the Cosmos, 
reproducing the sequence of stages in the development of life from a life impulse to 
phenomena of a spiritual nature. Nevertheless, the author is mostly interested in those 
arguments of the Scheler position that enter into a dispute with Christian-Jewish dog-
ma: it reveals a double dependence of his constructions on the idea of the formation 
of the world and movement towards the realization of a higher being (an analogue of 
God, but endowed with a paradoxical characteristic of formation) (Giubilato, 2018, 
153). Repeating the Kantian comparison of a human being with angels, Edith Stein 
points out a special kind of power—the power of the spirit, which presupposes only a 
movement towards perfect possession of it, but never achievement of this possession. 
Such a view nevertheless allows for the possibility of accumulation of strength and 
progressive development. However, from this point of view, the maximum strength is 
connected with the fact that it grows, being shared with others, which “corresponds 
to the nature of the divine spirit to emanate and radiate, but without consuming itself 
[„es entspricht dem Wesen des göttlichen Geistes, von sich auszugehen und auszus-
trahlen, allerdings ohne sich zu verzehren“]” (Giubilato, 2018, 157).
Spanish researcher Javier San Martín from the National University of Distant 
Education of Madrid, Spain addresses the interpretation of the causes of tension be-
tween anthropology and phenomenology. The author connects the divergence of 
these theoretical programs with a trend in phenomenology aimed at criticizing “psy-
chologism.” “But psychologism is nothing more than the disciplinary word for a basic 
theme of our age [„Der Psychologismus ist aber nichts anderes als das disziplinäre 
Wort für ein Grundthema unseres Zeitalters“]” (Giubilato, 2018, 162). Modern trends 
in cognitive research do not seek to “more than justify psychology as the main science 
that explains all human life and its cultural products [„als grundlegende Wissenschaft 
zu setzen, um die Gesamtheit des menschlichen Lebens und seine kulturellen Produk-
te zu erklären“]” (Giubilato, 2018, 162), but rather understand it as a science that con-
siders a person and his psyche, as products of evolutionary development. In this sense, 
the gap between psychology and anthropology is eliminated. It seems that Husserlian 
objection to considering mathematical truths as the product of a creature accidentally 
generated by nature should automatically be transferred to anthropology, understood 
as a science, which is taken to justify the natural and cultural modes of human exist-
ence. However, this objection has ceased to be justified since M. Scheler announced a 
program of substantiation of philosophical anthropology as the first philosophy. The 
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author of the article believes that from the 20s ethical issues are no longer interpreted 
by Husserl as the subject of a “second philosophy,” but refers to the first. As a result, 
“Husserl can reasonably assert that his entire philosophy is a hermeneutics of human 
life, or a general, absolute spiritual science [„Gerade deshalb kann Husserl sinnvoll 
behaupten, dass seine ganze Philosophie eine Hermeneutik des menschlichen Lebens 
sei, oder eine generelle absolute Geisteswissenschaft“]” (Giubilato, 2018, 177). Ac-
cording to the author, anthropological motives, including those drawn from Dilthey’s 
philosophical ideas, are synthesized in it in the concept of the life world.
Cecilia Monteagudo from the Pontifical Catholic University of Lima, Peru ad-
dresses the issue of the relevance of the phenomenological concept of the life world 
in Gadamer hermeneutics. The author questions the conventional wisdom that Gad-
amer comes to a phenomenological theme, following Heidegger along the path of 
criticizing the foundations of phenomenology. An analysis of the concept of the life 
world, as presented in Truth and Method, and a number of other works included in the 
10-volume book, show the opposite—phenomenology is an independent line of Gad-
amer’s philosophical evolution and an independent source of hermeneutical ideas.
Among the mentioned parallels, discovered by the author between the phenom-
enological concept of Husserl’s life world and Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, 
the author pays less attention to disputes on the various forms of hermeneutic reflec-
tion (hermeneutics of trust, hermeneutics of suspicion, post-hermeneutics, etc.), and 
he turns with great interest to what constitutes the general conviction of the so-called 
“continental philosophy.” 
The determination of the humanities as practical sciences, which promote solidarity and 
respect for the plurality of life forms, presupposes their emancipation from the objectiv-
istic claim in which they are still caught. Only after this emancipation can the humanities 
become a role model and orientation point for human practice according to the goal of a 
moral foundation for our common future [„Die Bestimmung der Geisteswissenschaften 
als praktische Wissenschaften, welche die Solidarität und den Respekt gegenüber der 
Pluralität der Lebensformen fördern, setzt allerdings ihre Emanzipation von dem objek-
tivistischen Anspruch, in dem sie immer noch verfangen sind, voraus. Erst nach dieser 
Emanzipation können die Geisteswissenschaften zum Vorbild und Orientierungspunkt 
für die menschliche Praxis gemäß dem Ziel einer moralischen Stiftung unserer gemein-
samen Zukunft werden“]. (Giubilato, 2018, 192)
Alice Serra from the Federal University of Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, Bra-
zil, draws attention in her article to the influence of the ideas of phenomenology on 
the theory of deconstruction of Jacques Derrida. Quoting Derrida’s confession that 
“Husserl’s phenomenology, by abandoning theoretical and speculative presupposi-
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tions, remains an inspiring source for the deconstruction” (Giubilato, 2018, 202). The 
author traces the main strategies of criticism of phenomenology—clarification of the 
premises of the “philosophy of presence,” the restrictions that impose on the inter-
pretation of the sign and Husserl’s preferences of the sounding voice over the text (in 
the criticism of which the well-known concept of “writing” and “trace” is born). This 
criticism of the “anthropologism” of phenomenology (a tendency that the thoughts 
of Derrida and some of his associates, phenomenology shares with Hegelianism and 
Heidegger’s philosophy). A criticism of the “philosophy of presence” is shown by the 
author as the historically first thematic block on which Derrida works out the main 
critical arguments—assumes as a hidden motive of the phenomenology’s “an insist-
ence on preserving ideality (Idealität)” (Giubilato, 2018, 195).
Moving from earlier works on Husserl to later works, the author believes that 
the common denominator of the analysis undertaken by Derrida is the fact that 
“Deconstruction can be interpreted as a sort of ‘super-phenomenological critique’ 
(über-phänomenologische Kritik) which absorbs the phenomenological critique of 
dogmatic metaphysics and turns it against phenomenology itself ” (Giubilato, 2018, 
202). The author pays special attention to criticism of limitrophy (neologism derived 
from the word limit)—the boundary of the boundaries, according to Derrida, who, 
behind the tendency of phenomenology to limit phenomena and the restriction of 
regions and reflection on boundaries. He reveals the presence of boundaries in the 
third sense overcoming borders as a passage through and through, entry, exit, return, 
slip, dislocation, diffraction (through a door or window sill). Bringing to the surface 
the fact that such “analogues” are not external to phenomenology,
…but, rather, are implied in its very core, deconstruction unfolds the way phenomenol-
ogy is self-deconstructed due to a continual necessity of revising its margins of certainty 
and restating its own boundaries. (Giubilato, 2018, 207)
Luis Niel from National University of Litoral, Santa Fe, Argentina (CONICET / 
Universidad Nacional del Litoral, Santa Fe, Argentina) in the article “Intentionality 
and its Objects. Tim Crane’s philosophical project and phenomenology” refers to one 
of the concepts that continue and develop Husserl’s phenomenological project, or, 
more precisely, in the debate of phenomenology and analytical philosophy that has 
lasted more than a decade, about the limits and boundaries of the substantiation of a 
phenomenological project. Intentionality in these disputes has always occupied a place 
of honor, and for the concept being analyzed it turns out to be a tool of a dispute with 
representatives of the analytical tradition and with the supporters of phenomenology. 
Tim Crane connects intentionality with the problem of representing non-existent ob-
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jects, and introducing a subtle differentiation between the positions of the philosophy 
of consciousness, criticizing the philosophy of consciousness with phenomenology 
and criticizing phenomenology with the analytical philosophy. Crane discovers a way 
of interpreting intentionality, which rehabilitates psychologism in a new sense: “…
conclusion about the problem of non-existent objects is that the solution shall not rely 
on logic or on semantics, but rather on psychologism, namely, on the psychological 
nature of representation” (Giubilato, 2018, 220). Recognition of psychological reality 
is the only solution for such an eternal philosophical problem as non-existence. 
Gustavo Gómez Pérez from the Javeriana Pontifical University, Bogotá (Pon-
tificia Universidad Javeriana, Bogotá, Colombia) focuses on the interpretation of the 
gesture that we can find in M. Merleau-Ponty. In the author’s interpretation it is not 
the language that turns out to be a praphenomenon for explaining the expressive ca-
pabilities of the body, but, on the contrary, it is the gesture that turns out to be the 
prototype for interpreting the language. It is proposed to understand the language 
on a basis of the hypothesis of “gesture syntax” (Giubilato, 2018, 222) without con-
trasting conceptualization and the lived intention of speech, without cooling off in 
a fixed contrast between subject and object. Turning to the “gestural syntax” allows 
Merleau-Ponty to present in a new light the contrast between language and speech 
proposed by F. de Saussure: paying particular attention to the analogs of gestures in 
the language—diacritics, the French thinker emphasizes the importance of differenti-
ation, function of these signs is the opposite of the definition. In this context, silence 
comes to the fore as a communicative element, delaying the completion of a phrase 
and the final definition of meaning. This delay does not so much function as an obsta-
cle to the understanding of what has been said, but rather as a mechanism that incites 
the listener to design horizons of meaning, the possibilities of its implementation, “a 
sort of invitation to action” (Giubilato, 2018, 229). 
R. S. Oliveira (State University of Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, Brazil) stud-
ies W. Flusser’s phenomenological ideas of—the theme of “outsiders” and marginal 
trends in evolution of phenomenological philosophy. “Bodenlos” as a metaphor and 
as a research program opens the analysis proposed in the article. The critical impulse 
of Flusser’s interpretation of phenomenology marks the very heart of the phenome-
nological approach—it turns to the inside of the rational interpretation of the world, 
explores “efforts to combat thought” (Giubilato, 2018, 238). In criticizing phenome-
nological reduction, Flusser comprehends the necessary steps in further movement 
along this path—the rejection of the judgments of common sense and mental habits 
cannot be stopped when the clarification of their foundations is reached. “After ques-
tioning an established belief, the belief itself is forever modified” (Giubilato, 2018, 
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239). Therefore, the change of point of view on the data of experience should be op-
posed to the experience of groundlessness, Bodenlosigkeit. Flusser draws his criticism 
to the apparent omnipotence of doubt, chosen by philosophy since the time of Des-
cartes as the main methodological tool. Following Flusser’s Nietzschean logic of reval-
uing values, the author upholds the positive meaning of Bodenlosigkeit. 
Dai Takeuchi from Jichi Medical University, Tochigi, Japan, refers to Eugen 
Fink’s phenomenology, intending to discover a new metaphysics of the world in his 
ideas of the meontic that disputes the influence on the phenomenology of German 
idealism and the idea of a unified understanding of life.
Eugen Fink, according to Dai Takeuchi, did not publish his research on the top-
ic of nothingness, so the reconstruction of his position on this issue needs to be ad-
dressed to his archive. He is inspired by the ideas of the Neoplatonists on the one hand 
and his thinking about the source (Ursprungsdenken) in the Neo-Kantian tradition 
(first of all, the ideas of Herman Cohen). On the other hand, such a source can be un-
derstood as the world (Giubilato, 2018, 250). Therefore, the phenomenon of the world 
is not removed by the negation of denial, it appears on the other side of this work of 
negation. Born in the same decade that Heidegger’s Being and Time, the meontic con-
cept of O. Fink, according to the author, combined not only the ideas of the Husserlian 
study of time in terms of retention and tension, but also some of the mental moves 
worked out by Heidegger. This concept of time fluctuation introduced by Fink allows 
us to come back to the problems of the world: 
the world is not a mere continuation of the horizon. The horizon is potentially infinite 
which can be gradually actualized by the practical ability ‘I can.’ In contrast, the totality 
of the world is not accessible by the same way. (Giubilato, 2018, 256)
As applied to the world, the concept of the game can and should be used, since 
“…Fink saw the world as bottomless ‘play’ and, as such argued that the world was not 
necessary. The world exists in a proto-accidental sense beyond the horizon of the ne-
cessity and accidence” (Giubilato, 2018, 257).
Panos Theodorou from the University of Crete, Greece (University of Crete, 
Rethymno, Greece) refers to the idea of a “natural state” in the light of the human 
rights problem of Hannah Arendt. In this message, the emphasis is on the border be-
tween natural and cultural creatures. Quoting H. Arend, the author connects human 
rights with the political state: “…humans can only be considered beings with indisput-
able dignity and rights when they are political agents, when they speak and act within 
the public sphere of a politically organized society with positive law” (Giubilato, 2018, 
260). In this context, all other meanings of the “naturalness” of a person are beyond 
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these supposed phenomenon political limits. The author proposes to test H. Arendt’s 
idea for strength and compare a political person with the pre-political and prehistoric 
“states” of the human tribe. The key point is the idea of multiplicity, overcoming the 
abstractness of “social atomism.” The author shows that even if we do not agree with 
the definition of a person as a cultural being, overcoming his natural predestination 
and setting supernatural goals. If we believe that a person and human tribes simply 
exist, and do not realize the divine purpose in achieving eternal peace or reasonable 
perfection—and in this case, the idea of plurality is important to substantiate this an-
timetaphysical hypothesis. Just as H. Arendt, the author understands the multiplicity 
of points of view as a condition for coexistence, however disagreeing with H. Arend 
in assessing the role of the political space, comes to the same need to reckon “…with a 
multiplicity of multifarious systems of values. This is, in the end, what defines and de-
termines the reality around us and organizes it into a cosmos” (Giubilato, 2018, 273).
The monograph ends with an article by Hans Rainer Sepp from the Prague 
Charles University, entitled “Phenomenology as an ecology.” In this article, he refers 
to mutually opposite approaches. It seems, to derive human features from laws the 
policy to which all other social institutions (primarily the family) are subordinated 
and adjusted; or, on the contrary, to interpret the family, household (oikos) as the ele-
mentary particle, which the policy is made from. But, if we understand the product of 
the policy or oikos—the human individuality—as a more complex formation than the 
function of one or another type of community, as 
…self-being in the sense that the individual human existence lives by experiencing, i.e. 
only lives in such a way that it exists within itself from within. This insistence is so rudi-
mentary that it does not come about as a result of behavior [„ …Selbstsein in dem Sinn, 
dass die einzelne menschliche Existenz lebt, indem sie erlebt, d. h. nur so lebt, dass sie 
aus einem Innestehen in sich selbst heraus existiert. Dieses Innestehen ist so rudimentär, 
dass es nicht erst als Resultat eines Verhaltens zustande kommt“]. (Giubilato, 2018, 278)
In the same way as belonging to the oikos and the status of a stranger in a polis 
(metoikos) can be considered as two opposite poles in determining the individual’s 
strategy in relation to society, in the same way we find in the individual a peculiar 
eccentricity. As rooted in the polis or the stranger, the individual discovers in his exist-
ence “a center that is, however, in tension with its edges [„eine Mitte, die jedoch in der 
Spannung zu ihren Rändern steht… “]” (Giubilato, 2018, 279) which makes a person’s 
life an eternal journey in a futile attempt to find oneself. As persuasive as this parallel 
between the external and internal modes of existence may be, the human individual-
ity is distinguished by topos—the place of being. In this sense, oikos has a preference 
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over all other forms of social existence: “a house is a medium of rudimentary reflec-
tion, through which human existence reflects its place [„Das Haus ist damit Medium 
einer rudimentären Reflexion, durch die menschliche Existenz ihren Ort spiegelt“]” 
(Giubilato, 2018, 281). In various forms of housekeeping, the form of the transition 
from individuality in its independence to individuality in its social communication is 
honed or eliminated: “the name for this interaction is a habit: it indicates equally the 
social schematism of the ‘habitual’ and the bodily actions of the individual existences 
expressing a tendency toward self-organization… [„Ein Name für diese Interaktion 
ist das Wort Gewohnheit: Es verweist ebenso auf soziale Schemata des ‚Gewohnten’ 
als auch auf leibliche Verhaltungen der einzelnen Existenz, welche die Tendenz zum 
Ausdruck bringen, sich einzurichten…“]” (Giubilato, 2018, 283). This kind of hab-
it is the feeling of being in a familiar place—for example, understanding oneself in 
terms of “above”—“below”—and transferring these high-quality forms of self-orien-
tation on social hierarchies. Eccentricity can be also understood as more radically—as 
egocentrism in its more radical and less wild modifications. Demonstrating the wide 
thematic range of the idea of oikology, at the end of the article the author focuses on 
philosophical oikology, which he understands as the radicalization of the oikologi-
cal approach that controls behavior—an explanation of the conditions and structures 
of reflective modes of behavior (especially high-level ones—religion, art, philosophy, 
science) (Giubilato, 2018, 289).
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